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“I WALK IN, SIGN. I DON’T HAVE TO GO THROUGH 
CONGRESS.”1 PRESIDENT TRUMP’S USE OF EXECUTIVE 
ORDERS TO UNRAVEL THE PATIENT PROTECTION AND 
AFFORDABLE CARE ACT 
ELIZABETH VAN NOSTRAND* AND TINA BATRA HERSHEY** 
ABSTRACT 
Executive orders, used by presidents to advance their administrations’ 
agendas, have changed history. These powerful written instruments were used 
to confine Japanese Americans during World War II, desegregate public 
schools, and create NASA. On the day of his inauguration, President Donald J. 
Trump issued his first Executive Order which directed secretaries of executive 
branch agencies to begin dismantling President Barack Obama’s flagship 
initiative—the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA). This action, 
along with subsequent executive orders, precipitated a flurry of regulatory 
change and judicial challenges. Whether President Trump will ultimately be 
successful in crippling the ACA is still to be determined; however, his use of 
executive orders and the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the scope and limits 
of presidential authority will affect all future administrations.  
  
 
 1. Igor Bobic, Donald Trump Repeats Vows to Revoke Obama’s Executive Orders, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 16, 2015), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/donald-trump-
executive-orders_us_5671c88ee4b0688701dbfb29. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
“We finally declared that in America, health care is not a privilege for a 
few, but a right for everybody.” President Barack Obama celebrating the 
seventh anniversary of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act2 
The initiative that singularly defines President Barack Obama’s domestic 
legacy is the passage of two companion laws—The Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act of 20103 and the Health Care and Education Reconciliation 
Act of 20104 (collectively referred to as the ACA). The ACA is the most 
comprehensive and radical federal health care reform enacted in the U.S. since 
the Medicaid Act of 1965.5 This dramatic transformation of the U.S. health care 
system was necessitated by decades of escalating health care costs coupled with 
declining health outcomes.6 In 2016, health care spending in the U.S. reached 
$3.3 trillion, reflecting an increase of 4.3% over the previous year7 and 
representing 17.9% of the nation’s total gross domestic product.8 Despite 
disproportionate and unbridled spending, among thirty-six industrialized 
nations, the U.S. ranks twenty-ninth in infant mortality9 and twenty-sixth for life 
expectancy.10 Although the U.S. spends more on health care than any other 
nation, we lag behind comparable countries in key health outcomes.11 
In response, the ACA was enacted to improve health outcomes while 
controlling health care costs through three main objectives: (1) reforming the 
private insurance market to make health care insurance more affordable; (2) 
expanding Medicaid coverage for all adults with incomes below 138% of the 
federal poverty level; and (3) lowering the cost of health care by influencing the 
 
 2. Bob Bryan, Obama Defends Obamacare: ‘America is Stronger Because of the Affordable 
Care Act’, BUS. INSIDER (March 23, 2017), https://www.businessinsider.coc/barack-obama-
statement-on-obamacare-affordable-care-act-2017-3. 
 3. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010). 
 4. Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 
1029 (2010). 
 5. Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286 (1965). 
 6. AARON MCKETHAN ET AL., IMPROVING QUALITY AND VALUE IN THE U.S. HEALTH CARE 
SYSTEM 41 (2009). 
 7. National Health Expenditure Data, CTRS. MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., https://www.c 
ms.gov/reserese-statistics-data-and-systems/statistics-trends-and-reports/nationalhealthexpnationa 
/nationalhealthaccnationalhealtha.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2019). 
 8. Id. 
 9. AMERICA’S HEALTH RANKINGS UNITED HEALTH FOUND., 2016 ANNUAL REPORT, 
https://www.americashealthrankings.org/learn/reports/2016-annual-report/comparison-with-
other-nations. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Irene Papanicolas et al., Health Care Spending in the United States and Other High-
Income Countries, 319 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1024, 1025 (2018). 
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way health care decisions are made.12 Since its enactment, more than twenty 
million adults have acquired health insurance coverage, with widespread gains 
across all racial and ethnic groups, including blacks (3 million), Latinos (4 
million), and non-elderly whites (8.9 million).13 Some of the most popular 
changes implemented by the ACA are eliminating lifetime and annual limits on 
the dollar value of benefits,14 allowing children to remain on their parents’ health 
insurance plans until age twenty-six,15 and prohibiting discrimination based 
upon preexisting conditions or health status (guaranteed issue).16 Approximately 
twenty-seven percent of adults ages eighteen to sixty-four (fifty-two million 
people)17 have conditions that would have precluded them from obtaining 
insurance before the enactment of the ACA. 
More than eight years after its passage, the ACA remains controversial. An 
August 2018 survey reveals that fifty percent of Americans favor the ACA;18 
however, there is a distinct partisan divide. Seventy-seven percent of Democrats 
support the law with an equal percentage of Republicans (seventy-eight percent) 
holding unfavorable views.19 Seventy-five percent of Americans, however, 
favor continuing the preexisting condition protection provisions of the ACA, 
including a majority of both parties (eighty-six percent of Democrats, fifty-eight 
percent of Republicans).20 
Nevertheless, in Texas v. United States, twenty Republican state attorneys 
general and two individuals filed suit challenging the ACA in its entirety or, in 
the alternative, specific portions of the law, including the preexisting condition 
 
 12. Affordable Care Act (ACA), HEALTHCARE.GOV, https://www.healthcare.gov/glossary/ 
affordable-care-act/. 
 13. Namrata Uberoi et al., Health Insurance Coverage and the Affordable Care Act, 2010-
2016, DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS. (2016), https://aspe.hhs.gov/system/files/pdf/1875 
51/ACA2010-2016.pdf. 
 14. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-11(a)(1)(A)-(B) (2012). 
 15. Id. § 300gg-14(a). 
 16. Id. § 300gg-1; Id. § 300gg-2; Id. §§ 300gg-4. 
 17. Gary Claxton et al., Preexisting Conditions and Medical Underwriting in the Individual 
Insurance Market Prior to the ACA, KAISER FAM. FOUND. 1, 2 (2016), https://www.kff.org/health-
reform/issue-brief/pre-existing-conditions-and-medical-underwriting-in-the-individual-insurance-
market-prior-to-the-aca/. 
 18. Ashley Kirzinger et al., Kaiser Health Tracking Poll – Late Summer 2018: The Election, 






 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
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protection.21 On June 7, 2018, the Department of Justice, on behalf of the Trump 
administration, filed a brief declining to defend the constitutionality of the 
ACA.22 Recognizing the popularity among Americans for continuing 
preexisting coverage protections, Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-
KY) boldly claimed that “[t]here’s nobody in the Senate that I’m familiar with 
who is not in favor of coverage of pre-existing conditions.”23 And, although his 
administration is instrumental in the Texas v. United States case, President 
Trump now pledges to support preexisting condition coverage.24 
The Republican party has long desired to repeal President Obama’s 
signature health care achievement.25 In fact, repealing the ACA “very, very 
quickly”26 is a mantra for the Trump administration and many Republican 
legislators. Since his inauguration and through the end of 2018, President Trump 
has issued eighty-five executive orders, three of which directly target the ACA.27 
This Article first provides an overview of the power and effect of presidential 
executive orders, then focuses on President Trump’s use of these instruments to 
dismantle President Obama’s flagship program. 
 
 21. Id.; Complaint at 1–5, Texas v. United States, Civil Action No. 4:18-cv-00167-O (N.D. 
Tex. Feb. 26, 2018). 
 22. Letter from Jeff Sessions, III, Attorney General, on Texas v. United States, No. 4:14-cv-
00167-O (N.D. Tex.) to Paul Ryan, Speaker of the House (June 7, 2018); see also Katie Keith, 
Trump Administration Declines to Defend the ACA, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (June 8, 2018), 
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20180608.355585/full/. 
 23. Steven T. Dennis & Sahil Kapur, McConnell Defends Lawsuit to Undo Pre-Existing 
Condition Protection, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 18, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/ 
2018-10-18/mcconnell-defends-trump-backed-suit-on-health-care-protections. 
 24. Jacob Pramuk, Trump Pledges to Support Pre-Existing Conditions Coverage Even as His 
Administration Backs Lawsuit to Scrap It, CNBC (Oct. 22, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/10/ 
19/trump-says-he-backs-pre-existing-conditions-coverage-his-actions-say-no.html. 
 25. Jessie Hellmann, Ryan: Obamacare Repeal is First Priority Under Trump, HILL (Dec. 4, 
2016), https://thehill.com/homenews/house/308691-repealing-obamacare-first-priority-for-repub 
licans-under-trump. 
 26. Jenna Johnson, Trump’s Grand Promises to ‘Very, Very Quickly’ Repeal Obamacare Run 
Into Reality, WASH. POST (July 18, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trumps-grand 
-promises-to-very-very-quickly-repeal-obamacare-run-into-reality/2017/07/18/91b5f220-6bd3-11 
e7-9c15-177740635e83_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.ab04f1671282. 
 27. Executive Orders, FEDERAL REGISTER, https://www.federalregister.gov/presidential-doc 
uments/executive-orders (last updated Apr. 2, 2018). 
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II.  THE EFFECT AND SCOPE OF EXECUTIVE ORDERS 
A. The Effect: “Stroke of the Pen. Law of the Land. Kind of Cool.”28 Paul 
Begala, Aid to President William J. Clinton, Upon Discovering the Effect 
of Executive Orders 
The Founding Fathers recognized the importance of a tripartite system of 
government. “The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and 
judiciary in the same hands . . . may justly be pronounced the very definition of 
tyranny.”29 Each federal government branch has clearly defined authorities and 
control. With the exception of the veto power, the president has no authority to 
engage in lawmaking; rather, executive power is given to the Office of the 
President30 to faithfully enforce the law. The president’s power is given great 
deference. Under common law, there is a rebuttable presumption that a 
president’s duties are properly discharged unless clear and convincing evidence 
is presented to the contrary.31  
Executive orders are instruments used by presidents and governors to direct 
executive branch agencies, establish policy, and issue declarations.32 
Throughout the history of the U.S., they have made a great impact. President 
Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation changed the legal status of subjugated 
Americans living in the Confederate South.33 Through Executive Order 9,066, 
President Franklin Delano Roosevelt instructed the Secretary of War to 
incarcerate Japanese Americans, German Americans, and Italian Americans in 
internment camps.34 On July 26, 1948, President Truman used an executive 
order to desegregate the military.35 Through an executive order, President 
Eisenhower placed the Arkansas National Guard under federal control and 
ordered them to mitigate violence associated with school integration in Little 
Rock.36 The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)37 and the 
Warren Commission to investigate President Kennedy’s assassination38 were 
established through executive orders by Presidents Eisenhower and Johnson, 
 
 28. James Bennet, True to Form, Clinton Shifts Energies Back to U.S. Focus, N.Y. TIMES 
(July 5, 1998), https://www.nytimes.com/1998/07/05/us/true-to-form-clinton-shifts-energies-back-
to-us-focus.html. 
 29. THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison). 
 30. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; U.S. CONST. art. II, §§ 2–3; U.S. CONST. art. III § 2; U.S. CONST. 
art. II, § 3. 
 31. United States v. Chem. Found. Inc., 272 U.S. 1, 6 (1926). 
 32. VIVIAN S. CHU & TODD GARVEY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., EXECUTIVE ORDERS: 
ISSUANCE, MODIFICATION, AND REVOCATION 1 (2014). 
 33. Proclamation No. 95 (Jan. 1, 1863). 
 34. Exec. Order No. 9066, 7 Fed. Reg. 1407, 1474 (Feb. 25, 1942). 
 35. Exec. Order No. 9981, 13 Fed. Reg. 4311, 4313 (July 28, 1948). 
 36. Exec. Order No. 10,730, 22 Fed. Reg. 7573, 7628 (Sept. 25, 1957). 
 37. Exec. Order No. 10,783, 23 Fed. Reg. 7643, 7643 (Oct. 3, 1958). 
 38. Exec. Order No. 11,130, 28 Fed. Reg. 12,783, 12,789 (Dec. 3, 1963). 
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respectively. President Reagan used an executive order to convene the first 
Presidential Commission on the HIV Epidemic.39  
Executive orders are neither constitutionally nor statutorily defined.40 In 
practice, they are numbered, titled, signed, and published in the Federal Register 
and codified under Title 3 of the Code of Federal Regulations.41 Other 
instruments a president can use include memoranda, proclamations, presidential 
signing statements, and national security presidential directives.42 “In general 
. . . the difference [between these instruments] is typically one of form, not 
substance.”43 
B. The Scope: “The travel ban into the United States should be far larger, 
tougher and more specific-but stupidly, that would not be politically 
correct!” September 15, 2017 Tweet from President Trump in response to 
criticism of his executive orders issued to ban immigration from certain 
Muslim nations44 
The power of the president to issue executive orders is broad but not 
limitless.45 Executive orders are given the full force and effect of the law only 
when issued pursuant to constitutional or statutory authority.46 In the 
quintessential 1952 case of Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, members 
of the United Steelworkers of America threatened to strike over a wage 
dispute.47 President Truman, fearing that the work stoppage would jeopardize 
the Korean War effort, issued Executive Order 10,340, which directed the 
Secretary of Commerce to seize steel mills and keep them operating.48 The 
impacted companies sought to enjoin enforcement of the executive order.49 The 
 
 39. Exec. Order 12,601, 52 Fed. Reg. 24,127, 24,129–30 (June 29, 1987). 
 40. COMM. ON GOV’T OPERATIONS, 85TH CONG., EXECUTIVE ORDERS AND 
PROCLAMATIONS: A STUDY OF A USE OF PRESIDENTIAL POWERS 1 (Comm. Print 1957). 
 41. Id. at 37. 
 42. Tara L. Branum, President or King? The Use and Abuse of Executive Orders in Modern-
Day America, 28 J. OF LEGIS., 1, 7 (2002); see also Presidential Directives and Where to Find 
Them, LIBR. OF CONGRESS, https://www.loc.gov/rr/news/directives.html (showing how different 
presidents have referred to these with different names. For example, President Ronald Reagan 
called them “National Security Decision Directives,” President William Clinton used the title 
“Presidential Decision Directives,” and President Barack Obama issued “Presidential Policy 
Directives.”) (last visited Feb. 20, 2019). 
 43. Branum, supra note 42, at 7. 
 44. Tucker Higgins, Supreme Court Rules that Trump’s Travel Ban is Constitutional, CNBC 
(June 26, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/06/26/supreme-court-rules-in-trump-muslim-travel-
ban-case.html. 
 45. COMM. ON GOV’T OPERATIONS, supra note 40, at 14. 
 46. Id. at 32. 
 47. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 582 (1952). 
 48. Exec. Order No. 10,340, 17 Fed. Reg. 3139, 3141 (Apr. 10, 1952). 
 49. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 583. 
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Supreme Court ruled in favor of the steel companies, because President Truman, 
as the Commander in Chief, did not have power to take property in the way 
asserted and there was not explicit or implicit statutory authority allowing him 
to seize the mills to prevent work stoppages.50 Conversely, as demonstrated in 
Dames & Moore v. Reagan,51 where there is constitutional or congressional 
authorization as a basis for the executive order, the “strongest of presumptions” 
is given that the president is acting within his authority.52 
The boundaries of presidential authority to issue executive orders was 
recently challenged in the context of President Trump’s travel bans on foreign 
nationals from certain countries. The first travel ban, Executive Order 13,769, 
“Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States” (TB-
1), was issued on January 27, 2017, three days after President Trump assumed 
office.53 Authority to issue TB-1 was asserted under the U.S. Constitution and 
the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).54 TB-1 instructed the Secretary of 
Homeland Security to assess the adequacy of foreign governments’ adjudication 
procedures for their nationals seeking U.S. entry.55 Pending the assessment, TB-
1 immediately suspended for ninety days the immigration of individuals from 
six predominantly Muslim countries: Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, and 
Yemen.56 The entry of refugees from Syria, a seventh Muslim country, was 
halted indefinitely.57 The United States Refugee Admissions Program 
(USRAP), which requires that executive branch officials annually review the 
refugee situation, was suspended for 120 days.58 The directive that the 
Secretaries of Homeland Security and State prioritize the admission of 
individuals belonging to minority religions in the affected countries was met 
with great opposition.59 Since the dominant religion in each of the banned 
 
 50. Id. at 585. 
 51. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 654 (1981). 
 52. Id. at 670. 
 53. Exec. Order No. 13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Feb. 1, 2017); see also Andrew Katz, Trump’s 
First Day, TIME (Jan. 20, 2017), http://time.com/president-donald-trump-inauguration-day-photos/ 
(detailing President Trump’s first day in office). 
 54. Exec. Order No. 13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. at 8977; Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 
§§ 1101–1107 (2012); 3 U.S.C. § 301 (2012). 
 55. Exec. Order No. 13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. at 8977. 
 56. Exec. Order No. 13,780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13,209 (March 9, 2017). See generally Islamic 
Countries of the World, WORLD ATLAS, https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/islamic-countries-in-
the-world.html (discussing countries that practice Islam and have large Muslim populations). 
 57. Exec. Order No. 13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. at 8979. 
 58. Id.; The United States Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP) Consultation & Worldwide 
Processing Priorities, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS, https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/ 
refugees-asylum/refugees/united-states-refugee-admissions-program-usrap-consultation-world 
wide-processing-priorities (last visited Feb. 20, 2019). 
 59. See generally Maher Chmaytelli & Lin Noueihed, Global Backlash Grows Against 
Trump’s Immigration Order, REUTERS (Jan. 29, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-
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countries is Islam, under TB-1, immigration preference was given to Christians 
and other non-Muslims. 
Three days later, Washington and Minnesota, on behalf of their affected 
citizens, challenged the constitutionality of TB-1.60 In Washington v. Trump,61 
the states claimed that TB-1 was unconstitutional because (1) it violated due 
process and equal protection under the Fifth Amendment62 by discriminating 
against their residents on the basis of religion and nationality, and (2) it 
contravened the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment63 by giving 
preference to Christianity over Islam. The Trump administration asserted that 
courts have no authority to assess the validity of TB-1 since the Constitution 
gives the president “unreviewable authority” over certain matters of 
immigration.64 James Robart, Senior Judge for the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Washington, ruled in favor of the states and granted 
a nationwide temporary restraining order blocking the enforcement of TB-1.65 
The following day, the federal government filed an emergency motion seeking 
a stay of the district court’s temporary restraining order.66 In a per curium 
opinion, the Ninth Circuit denied the government’s motion and affirmed that, 
although the executive branch is owed substantial deference in matters of 
immigration and national security policy, such decisions are always subject to 
judicial review.67 
Rather than continuing to litigate, on March 6, 2017, President Trump used 
Executive Order 13,780,68 also entitled “Protecting the Nation From Foreign 
Terrorist Entry Into the United States,” (TB-2) to revoke TB-1. Authority for 
TB-2 was asserted under Article II of the Constitution and § 212(f) of the INA.69 
The Department of State completed its review of the conditions in six of the 
countries designated under TB-1. Until further assessment of the screening and 
vetting procedures was completed, a “temporary pause” was placed on entry of 
 
trump-immigration-reaction-idUSKBN15D0QM (discussing global views on President Trump’s 
executive order related to immigration). 
 60. Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1157 (9th Cir. 2017). 
 61. Id. at 1151. 
 62. Id. at 1165, 1167; U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 63. Washington, 847 F.3d at 1167; U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 64. Washington, 847 F.3d at 1161. 
 65. See Marilia Brocchetto, James Robart: 5 Things to Know About Judge Who Blocked 
Travel Ban, CNN (Feb. 4, 2017), https://www.cnn.com/2017/02/04/politics/judge-james-robart-
travel-ban-profile/index.html (explaining Judge James Robart’s experience with the judicial system 
and his background); Washington v. Trump, No. C17-0141JLR, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16012, at 
*7–8, *10 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 3, 2017). 
 66. Washington v. Trump, 691 Fed. Appx. 834, 835 (9th Cir. 2017). 
 67. Washington, 847 F.3d at 1156, 1164, 1169. 
 68. Exec. Order No. 13,780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13,209, 13,218 (Mar. 9, 2017). 
 69. Id. at 13,209; Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f) (2012). 
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nationals from Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen.70 Because of its 
close cooperative relationship with the U.S., citizens from Iraq, previously 
impacted by TB-1, were no longer affected by the ban.71 The indefinite 
exclusion of Syrian refugees and preference for those members of minority 
religions that were religiously persecuted were deleted from TB-2.72 
Numerous judicial challenges to TB-2 ensued, including cases in the Second 
(Alharbi v. Miller),73 Fourth (International Refugee Assistance Project (IRAP) 
v. Trump74), Sixth (Arab American Civil Rights League v. Trump75), and Ninth 
(State of Hawaii v. Trump76 and Toloubeydokhti v. Nielson77) Circuits. District 
Courts in the IRAP v. Trump and Hawaii v. Trump cases entered nationwide 
preliminary injunctions barring the enforcement of TB-2 and their respective 
Courts of Appeals affirmed.78 The Supreme Court granted certiorari, stayed the 
injunctions, and allowed TB-2 to go into effect;79 however, the temporary 
provisions in TB-2 expired before the Supreme Court could consider the merits 
of the cases, and the lower courts’ decisions were rendered moot.80 
A third iteration of the travel ban was issued through Presidential 
Proclamation No. 9645, entitled “Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and Processes 
for Detecting Attempted Entry Into the United States by Terrorists or Other 
Public-Safety Threats” (TB-3).81 The stated purpose of TB-3 was to assess the 
vetting procedures of certain countries to determine whether they adequately 
protect the U.S. from terroristic threats.82 Entry restrictions were placed upon 
immigration from Chad, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Syria, Venezuela, and 
 
 70. Exec. Order No. 13,780, supra note 68, at 13,211. 
 71. Id. at 13,212. 
 72. See generally id. 
 73. Alharbi v. Miller, No. CV 18-2435 at 1, 40, 41 (E.D.N.Y. April 25, 2018) (ex-parte petition 
for emergency writ of mandamus and complaint for declaratory and injunction relief). 
 74. Int’l. Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 241 F. Supp. 3d 539, 539, 543–44 (D. Md. 
2017) (this case was consolidated with two others: Iranian Alliances Across Borders v. Trump and 
Zakzok v. Trump). 
 75. Arab Am. Civil Rights League v. Trump, No. 2:17-CV-10310-VAR-SSD at 1, 11, 14, 15, 
17 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 25, 2018) (complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief). 
 76. Hawaii v. Trump, 859 F.3d 741, 741, 755 (9th Cir. 2017). 
 77. Toloubeydokhti v. Nielson, No. 3:18-CV-01587, at 1–5 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 26, 2018) (class 
action complaint for injunctive and declaratory relief and for writ of mandamus). 
 78. Int’l. Refugee Asst. Project v. Trump, 241 F.Supp. 3d 539, 566 (D.Md. 2017); Hawaii, 
859 F.3d at 788. 
 79. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2404 (2018). 
 80. Id. 
 81. Proclamation No. 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. 45,161 (Sept. 27, 2017). 
 82. Id. at 45,162. 
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Yemen.83 Again, President Trump pointed to the Constitution and certain 
provisions of the INA as giving him authority to issue TB-3.84 
Hawaii (as the operator of the University of Hawaii), three individuals with 
relatives from the affected states, and the Muslim Association of Hawaii 
(collectively, Hawaii) challenged TB-385 alleging that it violates provisions of 
the INA and the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. In sum, Hawaii 
asserted that TB-3 is an anti-Muslim directive rather than an initiative to further 
national security protections.86 Judge Derrick Watson from the United States 
District Court for the District Court of Hawaii granted a nationwide preliminary 
injunction barring the enforcement of TB-3, because the ban violated two 
provisions of the INA concerning the classes of aliens ineligible to receive 
visas87 and travel control of citizens and aliens.88 The Ninth Circuit granted a 
partial stay,89 but the Supreme Court stayed the injunction in full pending the 
disposition of the merits of the case.90 The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of 
Hawaii and determined that President Trump exceeded his authority under the 
INA when issuing TB-3.91 President Trump appealed.92 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Trump v. Hawaii.93 Hawaii again 
averred that TB-3 was unconstitutional, because the breadth of the proclamation 
exceeded statutory authority given to the President under the INA.94 The 
government argued that its actions were not reviewable; therefore, the courts had 
no authority to determine the validity of the proclamation.95 In a five to four 
decision, the conservative members of the Court reversed and remanded the 
Ninth Circuit’s determination.96 The authority for a president to act under certain 
provisions of the INA is “sweeping,” 97 and the INA “exudes deference to the 
President in every clause.”98 The president has “ample power” to impose entry 
 
 83. Id. at 45,164. On April 10, 2018, Chad was later removed from the listing through 
Presidential Proclamation Maintaining Enhanced vetting capabilities and Processes for Detecting 
Attempted Entry into the United States by Terrorists or Other Public-Safety Threats. Proclamation 
No. 9723, 83 Fed. Reg. 15,937, 15,939 (Apr. 13, 2018). 
 84. Proclamation No. 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. 45,161 (Sept. 27, 2017). 
 85. Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2406 (the plaintiffs did not challenge TB-3 as it applies to North 
Korea and Venezuela). 
 86. Id. at 2406, 2421. 
 87. Id. at 2406, 2413. 
 88. Id. at 2406, 2407. 
 89. Id. at 2406. 
 90. Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2406. 
 91. Id. at 2406–07. 
 92. Id. at 2406. 
 93. Id. at 2407. 
 94. Id. at 2408. 
 95. Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2407. 
 96. Id. at 2423. 
 97. Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043, 1049 (D.C. Cir. 1986). 
 98. Trump, 128 S. Ct. at 2408. 
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restrictions on groups of foreign nationals, and the asserted statutory basis for 
issuing TB-3 was “squarely within the scope of Presidential authority under the 
INA. Indeed, neither dissent even attempts any serious argument to the contrary, 
despite the fact that plaintiffs; primary contention below and in their briefing 
before [the Supreme] Court was that the Proclamation violated the statute.”99  
In addition to judicial challenges, executive orders can be modified by the 
president or the law affected by the executive order can be amended or rescinded 
by Congress, thereby rendering it moot.100 The president can review, revoke, 
amend, or supersede his own executive orders (which rarely occurs) or those of 
his predecessors (which President Trump has done with considerable 
frequency).101 For example, Trump Executive Order 13,780 TB-2102 revoked 
Trump Executive Order 13,769 TB-1.103 Trump Executive Order 13,783104 
revoked Obama Executive Order 13,653,105 therein rescinding risk management 
strategies designed to address climate change. Trump Executive Order 13,840106 
revoked Obama Executive Order 13547107 and eliminated President Obama’s 
coordinated efforts regarding ocean, coastal, and Great Lakes waters. Through 
executive orders, President Trump both established108 and terminated109 the 
Presidential Advisory Commission on Election Integrity. Having determined 
that “detention operations at the U.S. Naval Station Guantánamo Bay are legal, 
safe, [and] humane[,]” Trump Executive Order 13,823110 revoked Obama 
Executive Order 13,492,111 which would have eventually closed the facility.  
Congress may render an executive order moot by enacting or amending 
statutes to obviate the presidential instrument’s effect.112 Such congressional 
action is unlikely when the president and the congressional majority share the 
same political party. As of October 14, 2018, there were 235 Republicans, 193 
 
 99. Id. at 2408, 2415. 
 100. Elizabeth Van Nostrand & Tina Batra Hershey, “Stroke of the Pen. Law of the Land.” The 
Power and Appeal of Executive Orders, JPHMP DIRECT (Feb. 13, 2017), https://jphmpdirect.com 
/2017/02/13/stroke-of-the-pen-law-of-the-land-the-power-and-appeal-of-executive-orders/. 
 101. Sarah Kessler, There Are Three Ways to Revoke a U.S. President’s Executive Orders, and 
They Rarely Succeed, QUARTZ (Jan. 31, 2017), https://qz.com/898683/can-an-executive-order-be-
revoked/. 
 102. Exec. Order No. 13,780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13,209, 13,218 (Mar. 9, 2017). 
 103. Id. 
 104. Exec. Order No. 13,783, 82 Fed. Reg. 16,093, 16,094 (Mar. 31, 2017). 
 105. Id. 
 106. Exec. Order No. 13,840, 83 Fed. Reg. 29,431 (June 22, 2018). 
 107. Id. 
 108. Exec. Order No. 13,799, 82 Fed. Reg. 22,389 (May 16, 2017). 
 109. Exec. Order No. 13,820, 83 Fed. Reg. 969 (Jan. 8, 2018). 
 110. Exec. Order No. 13,823, 83 Fed. Reg. 4831 (Feb. 2, 2018). 
 111. Id. 
 112. VIVIAN S. CHU & TODD GARVEY, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV., EXECUTIVE 
ORDERS: ISSUANCE, MODIFICATION, AND REVOCATION 9 (2014), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RS 
20846.pdf. 
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Democrats, and seven vacant positions in the House of Representatives.113 In 
the Senate, Republicans held fifty-one seats, the Democrats had forty-seven, and 
there were two Independents114 If Congress were to amend a statute to render an 
executive order moot, a two-thirds votes would be required to overturn a 
presidential veto.115 Assuming that all Democrats and Independents would vote 
together in this scenario, 106 Republicans would need to vote against party lines 
to render an executive order ineffective. 
III.  REPEAL AND REPLACE: TAKING AIM AT THE ACA 
“We’ve been hearing about the disaster of Obamacare for so long . . . I 
just keep hearing repeal, replace, repeal, replace. Well, we’re starting that 
process.”116 President Trump’s Mission to Unravel the ACA 
Health care continues to be a dominant issue for Americans and is the top 
issue for voters in the 2018 mid-term elections117 President Trump, fulfilling 
campaign promises, has issued three executive orders directly aimed at 
dismantling the ACA: (1) Executive Order 13,765, “Minimizing the Economic 
Burden of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act Pending Repeal,”118 
(EO-1) attacking the ACA’s individual mandate and required essential health 
benefits; (2) Executive Order 13,798, “Promoting Free Speech and Religious 
Liberty,”119 (EO-2) targeting the ACA’s preventive care mandate; and (3) 
Executive Order 13,813 “Promoting Healthcare Choice and Competition Across 
the US”120 (EO-3), weakening the Health Insurance Marketplace by encouraging 
individuals to purchase insurance outside of the Health Insurance Marketplaces.  
 
 113. Congressional Profile: 115th Congress, 2nd Session, OFFICE OF THE CLERK OF THE U.S. 
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, http://clerk.house.gov/member_info/cong.aspx (last visited Feb. 20, 
2018). 
 114. Id. 
 115. Override of a Veto, UNITED STATES SENATE, https://www.senate.gov/reference/glossary_ 
term/override_of_a_veto.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2018). 
 116. Bob Bryan, Trump Just Took a Big Step to Unravel Obamacare, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 12, 
2017), https://www.businessinsider.com/trump-ahp-healthcare-insurance-obamacare-executive-ac 
tion-2017-10. 
 117. Phil Galewitz, Health Care Tops Guns, Economy as Voters’ Top Issue, KAISER HEALTH 
NEWS (Oct. 18, 2018), https://khn.org/news/health-care-tops-guns-economy-as-voters-top-issue/. 
 118. Exec. Order No. 13,765, 82 Fed. Reg. 8351 (Jan. 20, 2017); Timothy Jost, What Could 
President Trump Do Through Executive Order to Dismantle the ACA?, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Jan. 
12, 2017), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20170112.058318/full/. 
 119. Exec. Order No. 13,798, 82 Fed. Reg. 21,675 (May 4, 2017). 
 120. Exec. Order No. 13,813, 82 Fed. Reg. 48,385 (Oct. 12, 2017). 
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A. The Individual Mandate: “We repealed the core of disastrous 
Obamacare. The individual mandate is now gone.” President Trump in 
his January 30, 2018 State of the Union Address121 
EO-1 was issued hours after Donald Trump was sworn in as President of the 
United States.122 Pending the repeal of the ACA, EO-1 directed the Secretary of 
Health and Human Services (HHS) and the heads of all other executive branch 
agencies to “waive, defer, grant exemptions from, or delay the implementation 
of any provision or requirement of the [ACA] that would impose a fiscal burden 
on any State or a cost, fee, tax, penalty, or regulatory burden on individuals . . .” 
and other enumerated entities.123  
In part, EO-1 attacks the individual mandate—the ACA requirement that 
most U.S. citizens and individuals lawfully residing here purchase “minimum 
essential” health insurance or make a shared responsibility payment to the 
Internal Revenue Service (IRS).124 Four years before EO-1 was issued, the 
individual mandate withstood a judicial challenge from twenty-six states, 
“several individuals, and the National Federation of Independent Business[,]” 
Inc. (NFIB).125 In NFIB v. Sebelius, the plaintiffs alleged that Congress 
exceeded its enumerated powers under the Commerce Clause when enacting the 
individual mandate.126 The Supreme Court agreed, reasoning that the Commerce 
Clause empowers Congress to regulate commerce, which presupposes that there 
is something in existence that needs to be controlled.127 The individual mandate 
does not involve existing commercial activity; rather, it compels people to 
participate in commerce.128 “Construing the Commerce Clause to permit 
Congress to regulate individuals precisely because they are doing nothing would 
open a new and potentially vast domain to congressional authority.”129  
Instead, although the ACA describes the shared responsibility payment as a 
“penalty,” the Supreme Court deemed it to be a tax and constitutional under 
authority given to Congress pursuant to the Taxing and Spending Clause.130 The 
Court explained that the shared responsibility payment is a tax rather than a 
 
 121. Bruce Japsen, In State of the Union, Trump Touts End to Individual Mandate But Doesn’t 
Ask for Obamacare Repeal, FORBES (Jan. 30, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/brucejapsen/ 
2018/01/30/in-state-of-the-union-trump-touts-end-to-individual-mandate-but-doesnt-ask-for-
obamacare-repeal/#257d0babb164. 
 122. Exec. Order No. 13,765, 82 Fed. Reg. at 8351. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 5000A (2018); Exec. Order No. 13,765, 82 Fed. Reg. 
at 8351. 
 125. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 540 (2012). 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. at 550. 
 128. Id. at 552. 
 129. Id. (emphasis in original). 
 130. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 567 U.S. at 566, 570; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
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penalty, because the fee is not so onerous that individuals would have no choice 
but to purchase health insurance, nor is it limited to “willful violations” like 
many sanctions are.131  
EO-1 was President Trump’s attempt to revisit this issue. Although other 
rules reference EO-1 as the basis for their justification (such as 340B Drug 
Pricing Program Ceiling Price and Manufacturer Civil Monetary Penalties 
Regulation that delays the implementation date for civil money penalties for 
manufacturers who charge more than the ceiling price for certain drugs),132 
Congress acted before a regulation was promulgated on point. On December 22, 
2017, Congress passed H.R.1, “An Act to Provide for Reconciliation Pursuant 
to Titles II and V of the Concurrent Resolution on the Budget for Fiscal Year 
2018,”133 commonly referred to as the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA). As of 
2019, the TCJA eliminates the shared responsibility payment to the IRS; 
therefore, although there is still an individual mandate requirement, there is no 
penalty associated therewith.134 While this change is estimated to reduce the 
federal budget deficits by approximately $338 billion between 2018 and 2027, 
it is likely to increase the number of uninsured by 4 million in 2019 and 13 
million in 2027.135 Although premiums for unsubsidized enrollees for 2019 will 
be increased, the rise is not anticipated to destabilize the markets.136  
The plaintiffs in Texas v. United States argue that the elimination of the 
individual mandate penalty is fatal to the ACA and, as such, the entire law must 
fail.137 Instead of zealously arguing in favor of upholding a valid law, 
conversely, the federal defendants agree with many of the plaintiffs’ positions, 
including that the individual mandate and guaranteed issue provisions of the 
ACA are not severable.138 The federal defendants agree with the plaintiffs that 
since the individual mandate is unconstitutional in light of the TCJA, the 
preexisting condition protections are also invalid.139 As of October 23, 2018, the 
 
 131. The Roberts Decision–The Ends Justifies the Means, BELLE LIBERTY’S BLOG (Jun. 30, 
2012), https://belleofliberty.wordpress.com/2012/06/30/the-roberts-decision-the-ends-justifies-the 
-means/. 
 132. 340B Drug Pricing Program Ceiling Price and Manufacturer Civil Monetary Penalties 
Regulation, 83 Fed. Reg. 25,943, 25944 (Jun. 5, 2018). 
 133. See generally Individual Tax Reform and Alternative Minimum Tax, Pub. Law 115-97, 
131 Stat. 2054 (Dec. 22, 2017). 
 134. Id.; ANNIE L. MACH, THE INDIVIDUAL MANDATE FOR HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE: 
IN BRIEF (Cong. Res. Serv., 2018). 
 135. REPEALING THE INDIVIDUAL HEALTH INSURANCE MANDATE: AN UPDATED ESTIMATE 1 
(Cong. Budget Off., 2017). 
 136. FEDERAL SUBSIDIES FOR HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE FOR PEOPLE UNDER AGE 65: 
2018 TO 2028 2, 6–7 (Cong. Budget Off., 2018). 
 137. Texas v. United States, 340 F. Supp. 3d 579, 585 (N.D. Texas 2018). 
 138. Id. at 591. 
 139. See id. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2018] “I WALK IN, SIGN. I DON’T HAVE TO GO THROUGH CONGRESS.” 183 
District Court for the Northern District of Texas has not yet ruled on the merits 
of the case.140 
B. State Relief and Empowerment Waivers: “The fact is, due to the ACA, 
states have largely lost the power to advance and adopt their own 
solutions. Instead, the ACA imposed a one-size-fits-all set of federal 
regulations that put a straightjacket on state innovation”. October 22, 
2018 Blog Post by CMS Administrator Seema Verma141 
EO-1 also directs the Secretary of HHS and the heads of all other executive 
branch agencies to “exercise all authority and discretion available to them to 
provide greater flexibility to States and cooperate with them in implementing 
healthcare programs.”142 On October 24, 2018, the Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services (CMS) published new guidance143 on the use of the ACA’s 
§ 1332 waivers. These waivers allow states to seek a five year waiver to 
implement innovative ways to provide quality health care that is at least as 
comprehensive and affordable as other health care options.144 Under the ACA, 
such waivers could impact essential health benefits coverage and associated cost 
sharing, adjustments to premium tax credits, and modification or replacement of 
exchanges.145 
Under the new guidance, which replaces the 2015 guidance document issued 
under the Obama administration, the waivers are renamed the State Relief and 
Empowerment Waivers (SREW).146 In a major departure from the previous 
guidance, analysis of the comprehensiveness and affordability of coverage under 
a waiver will focus on access to coverage rather than on the coverage actually 
purchased.147 While the new guidance continues to require that a comparable 
number of individuals remain covered, the definition of coverage includes more 
types of coverage, such as short-term, limited-duration plans.148 Thus, if an 
individual chooses to purchase a plan with a lower premium and less 
comprehensive coverage (i.e., coverage that does not include the ACA’s 
 
 140. See generally id. 
 141. Seema Verma, New State Relief and Empowerment Waiver Guidance Gives States Tools 
to Help Fix Broken Health Insurance Markets, CMS: BLOG (Oct. 22, 2018), https://www.cms. 
gov/blog/new-state-relief-and-empowerment-waiver-guidance-gives-states-tools-help-fix-broken-
health-insurance. 
 142. Exec. Order No. 13,765, 82 Fed. Reg. 8351 (Jan. 24, 2017). 
 143. See generally State Relief and Empowerment Waivers, 83 Fed. Reg. 53,575, 53,576 (Oct. 
24, 2018). 
 144. Id. at 53,577, 53,580. 
 145. Jennifer Tolbert & Karen Pollitz, Section 1332 State Innovation Waivers: Current Status 
and Potential Changes, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (2017), https://www.kff.org/health-reform/issue-
brief/section-1332-state-innovation-waivers-current-status-and-potential-changes/. 
 146. State Relief and Empowerment Waivers, 83 Fed. Reg. at 53,576. 
 147. Id. at 53,578–79. 
 148. Id. at 53,576, 53,578. 
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essential health benefits), the ACA’s guardrails will be considered to be satisfied 
as long as at least one ACA-compliant plan is offered in the state. 
In addition, under the new guidance, states can allow individuals to use 
subsidies to purchase plans that are not ACA compliant,149 which was not 
previously permitted. In a nod towards the power of executive orders, in certain 
circumstances, a waiver may be authorized via governor’s executive order rather 
than state legislation.150  
C. The Preventive Care Mandate: “A landmark day for religious liberty.” 
House Speaker Paul D. Ryan’s (R-Wis.) response when the Trump 
Administration Issued New Regulations in Accordance with EO-2151 
With the exception of grandfathered plans, the ACA generally requires 
employers with fifty or more full-time employees to offer group health plans or 
coverage that provide “minimum essential coverage” without cost sharing.152 
Included within the essential minimum coverage are preventive care and 
screenings for women, frequently referred to as the preventive care mandate.153 
The specific services to be offered under this provision are determined by the 
Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA),154 a department within 
HHS. In August 2011, HRSA, basing its suggestions on Institute of Medicine 
recommendations, indicated that the preventive care mandate was to include 
“[a]ll Food and Drug Administration approved contraceptive methods, 
sterilization procedures, and patient education and counseling . . . .”155 
Exceptions were established for employers with fewer than fifty employees,156 
certain religious employers (including churches and their integrated 
auxiliaries),157 religious nonprofit organizations,158 and grandfathered health 
 
 149. Id. at 53,578. 
 150. Id. at 53,582. 
 151. Amy Goldstein et al., Trump Administration Narrows Affordable Care Act’s 
Contraception Mandate, WASH. POST (Oct. 6, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/ 
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 152. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(f)(2) (2012); see also id. § 4980. 
 153. Preventive Care Benefits for Women, HEALTHCARE.GOV, https://www.healthcare.gov/ 
preventive-care-women/ (last visited March 1, 2019). 
 154. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4) (2012). 
 155. Women’s Preventive Service Guidelines, HEALTH RESOURCES & SERV. ADMIN., 
https://www.hrsa.gov/womens-guidelines/index.html#2 (last visited on March 1, 2019). 
 156. Find Out How ACA Affects Employers with Fewer Than 50 Employees, IRS (May 13, 
2015), https://www.irs.gov/affordable-care-act/individuals-and-families/find-out-how-aca-affects-
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 157. 45 C.F.R § 147.131(a) (2016). 
 158. Id. at § 147.131(b). 
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plans (i.e., those plans existing prior to March 23, 2010 that had not made 
specified changes after that date).159 
EO-2 instructs the Secretaries of Treasury, Labor, and HHS (collectively the 
Departments) to “consider” issuing amended regulations to address conscience-
based objections to the preventive care mandate.160 Subsequently, on October 6, 
2017, two companion interim final rules (the 2017 IFRs) became effective: the 
“Religious Exemptions and Accommodations for Coverage of Certain 
Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act,”161 and the “Moral 
Exemptions and Accommodations for Coverage of Certain Preventive Services 
Under the Affordable Care Act.”162 The 2017 IFRs expand the exemptions to 
cover not only individuals who object to contraceptive coverage on religious 
grounds, but also individuals and entities that object on moral bases as well.163 
According to HRSA guidance, entities entitled to exemptions from providing 
the contraceptives under the preventive care mandate include for-profit entities 
that are publicly traded, closely held for-profit organizations, and institutions of 
higher learning.164  
Legal justification for expanding the exemptions was based on two Supreme 
Court cases. In Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, two privately owned companies 
objected to the ACA requirement that insurance plans provide coverage for 
certain forms of birth control, including emergency contraceptive pills and 
intrauterine devices, claiming that providing such coverage was against their 
religion.165 The two companies alleged that the coverage requirement violated 
the First Amendment and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 
(RFRA).166 The Supreme Court held that the protections offered to individuals 
under RFRA also extend to closely-held, for-profit corporations.167 In Wheaton 
College v. Burwell, decided just days after Hobby Lobby, a nonprofit liberal arts 
college in Illinois sought an injunction claiming that the requirement that it must 
designate an agent to pay for objectionable contraceptives was in violation of 
 
 159. Id. § 147.130(d); Grandfathered Health Plan, HEALTHCARE.GOV, https://www.health 
care.gov/glossary/grandfathered-health-plan/ (last visited March 1, 2019). 
 160. Exec. Order No. 13,798, 82 Fed. Reg. 21675 (May 9, 2017). 
 161. Religious Exemptions and Accommodations for Coverage of Certain Preventive Services 
Under the Affordable Care Act, 82 Fed. Reg. 47,792 (Oct. 13, 2017). 
 162. Moral Exemptions and Accommodations for Coverage of Certain Preventive Services 
Under the Affordable Care Act, 82 Fed. Reg. 47,838 (Oct. 13, 2017). 
 163. Id. at 47,840, 47,843 
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EXEMPTIONS AND ACCOMMODATIONS FOR COVERAGE OF CERTAIN PREVENTIVE SERVICES 
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 165. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 2751, 2755, 2759, 2765–66 (2014). 
 166. Id. at 2766; see also, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2012). 
 167. Burwell, 134 S.Ct. at 2759. 
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the First and Fifth Amendments and RFRA.168 The Supreme Court granted the 
application for injunction and recognized that the college did not need to use any 
governmental forms in order to receive an exemption.169 Rather, all that was 
required was informing the Secretary of HHS that “it is a nonprofit organization 
that holds itself out as religious and has religious objections to providing 
coverage for contraceptive services . . . .”170 The Court declined to rule on the 
merits of the claim.171  
The 2017 IFRs were recently challenged on procedural grounds in State of 
California v. Health and Human Services.172 California, Delaware, Maryland, 
New York, and Virginia claim that the Departments violated the Administrative 
Procedure Act (APA) by forgoing the appropriate notice and comment 
procedures when promulgating the 2017 IFRs.173 Notice and comment 
requirements can be waived “when the agency for good cause finds . . . that 
notice and public procedure thereon are impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary 
to the public interest.”174 Although the Departments solicited public comment 
on the 2017 IFRs until December 5, 2017, the regulations were effective 
immediately on the date of promulgation.175 The District Court held that the 
Departments had no statutory authorization to waive the APA’s notice 
requirement nor did it have good cause for doing so.176 The failure to provide 
advance notice and comment processes were deemed not to be a harmless error, 
and the plaintiff states were likely to suffer irreparable harm if the provisions in 
the interim final rules moved forward; thus, the court granted plaintiffs’ motion 
for a preliminary injunction.177 The number of states challenging the 
implementation of the rules has grown to fourteen. On January 13, 2019, the 
United States District Court for the Northern District of California granted the 
states’ motion for preliminary injunction but limited the scope of the injunction 
to the individual states, even though”[t]he Court fully recognizes that limiting 
the scope of this injunction to the Plaintiff States means that women in the other 
states are at risk of losing access to cost-free contraceptives when the final Rules 
take effect.”178  
 
 168. Wheaton College v. Burwell, 134 S.Ct. 2806, 2808–10 (2014). 
 169. Id. at 2814. 
 170. Id. at 2807. 
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D. The Health Insurance Marketplace: “Since Congress can’t get its act 
together on HealthCare, I will be using the power of the pen to give great 
HealthCare to many people – FAST.” President Trump’s October 10, 
2017 tweet providing justification for EO-3179 
EO-3, issued October 12, 2017, allows individuals to sign up for health care 
plans that are less regulated and provide less comprehensive coverage than those 
required under the ACA.180 President Trump claims that these changes are 
necessary because the ACA places severe limitations on health care options that 
results in expensive insurance premiums.181 Three unrelated private-sector 
health coverage options are targeted for amendment: association health plans 
(AHPs); short-term, limited duration insurance (STLDI), and health 
reimbursement arrangements (HRAs).182  
AHPs are arrangements that provide health coverage to a collective body of 
small businesses.183 They could be exempt from the ACA’s requirement to cover 
essential health benefits but, currently, must comply with other ACA mandates, 
including protecting people with preexisting conditions.184 In accordance with 
EO-3, on January 5, 2018, the Department of Labor issued a proposed regulation 
to amend the federal definition of “employer.”185 On June 21, 2018, the 
definitional change was adopted in a final rule.186 The definition was expanded 
to allow certain AHPs that were formerly regulated as individual or small-group 
coverage to be regulated as large-group coverage.187 This change allowed small 
employers to join together to buy insurance in the large group market, including 
purchases across state lines.188 Critics of the expansion argue that it will create 
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even higher premiums for those with more significant health care needs and 
destabilize the individual market.189 
STLDI is gap insurance that can be purchased by certain qualifying 
individuals.190 Formerly, STLDI provided coverage for up to three months for 
those individuals who were transitioning from one type of coverage to 
another.191 Prompted by EO-3, the Departments promulgated a final rule on 
August 3, 2018 that extends the definition of “short-term” to “less than 12 
months.”192 “Limited duration” is defined as thirty-six months.193 Young, 
healthy individuals would be inclined to seek insurance in non-ACA compliant 
plans, while those with serious health issues would be limited to insurance sold 
on the health care exchanges.194 This scenario would negatively impact the risk 
pool for the individual market resulting in market destabilization, especially 
when coupled with the dissolution of the individual mandate penalty.195 Further, 
it is estimated that these changes will result in increased premiums for ACA-
complaint plans by about 6 percent196 and cause 2.6 million individuals to lose 
long-term insurance.197 High cost is the primary factor for individuals choosing 
to terminate insurance coverage.198 
HRAs are those in which employers agree to pay or reimburse employees 
for medical expenses up to a certain dollar amount.199 HRAs are attractive to 
employees, because they are excluded from income and are not subject to 
income tax.200 On October 23, 2018, the Departments announced “a proposed 
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regulation [in response to EO-3] that expands the usability of health 
reimbursement arrangements (HRAs).”201 The proposed rule, to be published in 
the Federal Register on October 29, 2018, will undo prohibitions put into place 
by the Obama administration that did not allow employers to use HRAs to 
reimburse employees for the cost of individual health insurance coverage.202 
Under the new regulatory scheme, employers will be able to “reimburse 
employees for the cost of individual health insurance coverage” in certain 
circumstances, thereby extending the tax advantage that traditional employer-
sponsored coverage receives to HRAs.203 In addition, the proposed rule permits 
employers that provide “traditional employer-sponsored coverage to [fund] an 
HRA of up to $1,800 per year . . . to reimburse an employee for certain qualified 
medical expenses, including premiums for short-term, limited duration 
insurance plans.”204 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
“How much damage the executive order can do . . . [to] the ACA will 
depend on arcane details in the regulations yet to come.” Larry Levitt, Senior 
Vice President, in a tweet dated October 12, 2017205 
The president is tasked with ensuring that the laws are “faithfully 
executed[,]” including those that he does not favor.206 Under the Constitution, 
the ACA remains the law of the land until Congress rescinds it using the same 
procedures as when the statute was enacted.207 On August 2, 2018, Baltimore, 
Cincinnati, Chicago, and Columbus, as well as a married couple who purchased 
health insurance on Virginia’s health insurance marketplace, filed suit against 
President Trump, the Secretary of HHS, HHS, the Administrator of CMS, and 
CMS,208 averring that not only are the defendants in violation of their 
constitutionally-imposed duty, but that they are deliberately “sabotag[ing]” the 
ACA.209 Plaintiffs claim that the actions of the Trump administration, through a 
myriad of misdeeds, including the elimination of ACA guarantees, deterring 
enrollment in the health insurance marketplace plans, exacerbating health 
 
 201. U.S. Dep’t. of Labor News Release 18-1715-NAT (Oct. 23, 2018). 
 202. Id.; Stephen Miller, Regulations Aim to Let Employees Use HRAs to Buy Health Insurance, 
SOC’Y FOR HUM. RESOURCE MGMT. (Oct. 26, 2018), https://www.shrm.org/resourcesandtools/hr-
topics/benefits/pages/regulations-to-let-employees-use-hras-to-buy-health-insurance.aspx. 
 203. U.S. Dep’t. of Labor News Release 18-1715-NAT, supra note 201. 
 204. Id. 
 205. Larry Levitt (@larry_levitt), TWITTER (Oct. 12, 2017, 8:52 AM), https://twitter.com/larry 
_levitt/status/918504721140236288. 
 206. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
 207. I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983) (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 1, 7). 
 208. Complaint for Plaintiffs at 1, 9, 129, City of Columbus et al. v. Donald J. Trump et al., No. 
18-02364 (D. Md. filed Aug. 2, 2018). 
 209. Id. at 4. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
190 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF HEALTH LAW & POLICY [Vol. 12:169 
insurance costs, and undermining the individual mandate, are in direct disregard 
and violation of an existing law.210 Specifically, plaintiffs urge the court to 
enjoin the defendants from implementing EO-1 and EO-2, which were expressly 
issued “to undermine, rather than faithfully execute, the ACA.”211 At the time 
of this writing, the outcome of this case is yet to be determined.  
Candidate Trump unequivocally assured the Nation that he was “going to 
take care of everybody. . . . Everybody’s going to be taken care of much better 
than they’re taken care of now.”212 He promised that his administration’s health 
care insurance would be less expensive and far better than that provided under 
the ACA.213 Candidate Trump even vowed to support universal coverage so that 
every American would receive adequate health care.214 Regrettably, the agenda 
of President Trump and his administration, as reflected through executive 
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